Doctrine Of Eclipse

The doctrine of eclipse states that any laws made prior to the creation of the constitution, i.e. pre-constitution laws, but do not coincide with laws specified in the constitution after the constitution went into effect. In such a case, the laws are not void ab initio, but remain in effect until the relevant right is changed.


As a result, the Doctrine essentially aims to resolve the following quandary: If a law is declared void because it violates/contravenes a basic right, the right remains dormant until the right is altered so that the legislation is no longer conflicting with it.


Also Read: Overview of Indian Evidence Act 1872 | Evidence Law Explained


"This doctrine directly derives from Article 13(1) of the Constitution, which is part of the fundamental rights and specifies" that "any laws in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of this Constitution in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this Part, i.e. Part III, shall be void to the extent of such inconsistency."




The following are essential elements of the Eclipse Doctrine:


The law should be considered a "pre-constitutional law."


"It should be consistent with fundamental rights provisions."




The abovementioned law will only become operative/enforced again if the basic right is amended.




Origins And Evolution


The concept of eclipse can be traced back to 1948, when the state was granted the ability to exclude any private motor transport enterprises. This restriction became incompatible with the fundamental right guaranteed by article 19(1)g, which guarantees citizens of India the right to engage in any trade, occupation, or business, following the implementation of the Indian Constitution on January 26, 1950.




Following that, the Supreme Court addressed the problem in the case of Bhikaji versus State Of MP, and the act was changed by the 4th Amendment Act of 1955. This was the first case in which the "doctrine of eclipse" was applied and upheld as a legal principle.








"The idea was tacitly embraced in the Supreme Court's ruling in the Keshavan Case; it was further clarified by Das J.'s dissenting opinion in the Behram Case, and it was later established as legislation in the Bhikhaji Case," according to the statement.




Fundamental Rights in Retrospect


The retrospective character of the fundamental right was one of the key arguments debated before the Supreme Court in the case of Keshavan Madhava Menon versus The State Of Bombay. One of the concerns expressed was:


"If fundamental rights are retroactive, then all pre-Constitutional laws that violate fundamental rights must be declared void ab initio."




At this point, the constitutional court said, "What article 13(1) guarantees is that all existing legislation that conflict with the exercise of basic rights (established for the first time by the Constitution) shall be void to that degree." Because the fundamental rights became operative only on and from the date of the Constitution, the question of the contradiction of existing laws with those rights must obviously arise on and from that date.




As a result, article 13(1) can have no retrospective impact and is entirely prospective in its functioning." This meaning has been upheld in the following situations. The majority rejected the notion that the interpretation of "void" in article 13 (1) amounted to "repeal" of the Act.




State of Bombay vs. Behram Khurshid Pesikaka


This idea was further developed through many case laws, one of which being Behram Khurshid Pesikaka v. State of Bombay, in which Das J.'s dissenting judgment aided in interpreting this doctrine. The Supreme Court ruled in this instance that an existing law that violates a basic right is not fully dead even if it is no longer in effect as of the Constitution's start date.




"It is a good statute if an issue arises for determining rights and duties incurred prior to the commencement of the Constitution, as well as rights of persons who have not been awarded fundamental rights by the Constitution."








Das J. dissented from the bench's conclusion in this decision, noting, "The genuine position is that the impugned statute became, as it were, eclipsed, for the time being, by the basic right." The result of the Constitution (First Amendment) Act of 1951 was to remove the shadow and make the challenged Act free of any flaw or defect."




As a result, Das J's dissenting opinion meant that such regulations were in effect for non-citizens of India, but they remained dormant for Indian nationals. As a result, this case became the foundation of this concept, and Justice Das J's dissenting judgment has been the topic of several judicial rulings.




Doctrine's Applicability to Post-Constitutional Laws


The Indian Constitution prohibits the state from enacting laws that infringe the rights guaranteed by Part III, i.e., fundamental constitutional rights; hence, applying this approach to post-constitutional laws is not conceivable. If the state passes legislation that contradicts or violates Part 3 of the constitution, it will be ruled ultra vires and void to the extent that it violates fundamental rights.




This was also maintained in the case of Deep Chand vs. The State of UP, where it was determined that the two Article 13 clauses plainly differed. Under clause (1), pre-Constitutional laws remain in effect except to the extent that they conflict with Part III's provisions, whereas clause (2) prohibits the creation of post-Constitutional laws that do so, rendering any such laws that have already been passed null and void to the extent that they do.




In the case of State of Gujarat v. Shree Ambica Mills, however, it was determined that "like a pre-Constitutional law, a post-Constitutional statute contravening a basic right may likewise be legitimate in relation to those whose rights were not affected."




Conclusion And Analysis


"The preceding discussion and deliberation demonstrate that the founders of our constitution took great care in establishing article 13 of the Indian constitution."


Article 13 grants the essential rights "teeth," as well as the authority to defend them against attacks that violate the constitution. The way article 13 was drafted indicates that it was intended to embrace both pre-Constitutional and post-Constitutional laws in order to broaden the scope of basic rights protection.




The eclipse idea is an essential aspect of the constitution. This ideology is employed to keep the statues from being completely destroyed by only rendering them dormant for the time being. The author of this study work attempted to shed light on many aspects of doctrine and traced the growth of doctrine via various case laws.




The study discusses how the theory arose and was promulgated as legislation in the Bhikaji case, as well as how it was construed following the Keshvanan case.




One of the primary problems addressed in this study is whether fundamental rights are retroactive in nature. The author comes to the conclusion that fundamental rights are not retroactive in nature, which was also affirmed in the Keshavanan case.




As an example, if the basic rights were to be considered retrospective, all laws that violated the fundamental rights prior to the constitution would be declared null and void. "The concept was initially relevant to pre-constitutional legislation, but whether it is applicable to post-constitutional laws is still a point of contention among many jurists and legislators."




To summarize, the eclipse theory protects any legislation that violate fundamental rights by making them dormant/inactive rather than making them void ab initio. This idea is extremely important since it protects pre-constitutional laws while also assisting in the protection of post-constitutional laws to some extent.


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